Abstract-Adopting expert hardware to physical isolate the Trusted network from the Non-Trusted network can prevent all kinds of attack basing on network layer and operating system layer etc. This paper comes up with network isolation system model based on Reflective architecture. The Reflective GAP is hardware-based and its purpose is to rapidly mirror buffers between the NonTrusted memory and the Trusted memory. We realize it by LVDS bus and high speed double switch technique. Its activities are achieved using store & forward of memory blocks. Its software system comprises with seven main basic modules.
I. PREFACE
Although the technique of traditional Network Isolation card ensures network security, it forms an "isolated island" owing to lack of information exchange mechanism and at the same time limits the development of its application [1] . In the recent years, the rapidlydeveloped NetGAP technique is on the basis of physical isolation. While NetGAP technique ensures the security, it not only solves the difficulty of information exchange between networks, but also breaks through the application difficulty caused by security [2, 3] . NetGAP can physically isolate the internal and external networks. Its hardware includes PCI interface control circuits, network interface circuits and logic control circuits. At present NetGAP mostly bases on SCSI switch technique or bus switch technique. Its system always exists data exchange lowness and realtime bad. In order to overcome these problems, we come up with Reflective GAP design, making use of LVDS bus and high speed double switch architecture to automatically adapt its operation speed and mode to the network and securely isolate the internal and external networks.
II. CONSTITUTION
The NetGAP appliance features 2 built-in Single Board Computers (SBC):
·Non-trusted, connected to the non-trusted network ·Trusted, connected to the trusted network Inside the NetGAP device, the Trusted and NonTrusted are connected using specialized hardware. This hardware consists of proprietary Security Boards connected by a high-speed LVDS bus. The Security Boards themselves are plugged into each SBC via a PCI bus.
The Security Boards together with the LVDS bus implement Reflective GAP™ Technology. Each Security Board contains duplicate double switch architecture, with 4 switches in total. One double switch set is used for incoming traffic and the other is used for outgoing traffic. The double switch architecture ensures a complete physical disconnection between the trusted and NonTrusted without impairing the bus throughput.
The NetGAP implements Reflective GAP technology using two embedded RISC processors separated by Reflective GAP. The entire assembly is implemented as shown by the diagram below [4, 5] .
Supported by Foundation of production and research of Ministry of Education and Guangdong Province(2009B090300073), supported by JianXi Key new product plans ([2008]192) Peng Yun is corresponding author Reflective GAP is implemented in both hardware and software. When the GAP process is divided into two high-level tasks, one for incoming traffic and one for outgoing traffic, it can be describes as follows: Incoming Data:
The software runs on the NON-TRUSTED side terminates the TCP/UDP session and retrieves the data at the application layer. After receiving known amounts of data, the software signs the data and stores it on a known location in the Non-Trusted SDRAM memory for the TRUSTED to retrieve it.
When data passes through the hardware, it goes through two stages:
Check by the hardware to verify that the software signed it correctly, and then it is marked "valid" or "invalid" by the hardware. The data is encoded by the hardware to prevent hostile data to be executed on the TRUSTED.
Software on the TRUSTED side inspects the hardware flags for each data pack and retrieves only the valid data packages. After retrieving the data, it is checked against the rule-base to determine if it is "legal".
The rule base inspects the data for: Source and destination addresses, Special words and Protocol violations.
If the data is authorized the software retransmits it to the trusted network. Outgoing Data:
Software on the TRUSTED receives data from the trusted network aimed to the network using TCP/UDP protocols. The software terminates the TCP session and retrieves the data at the application layer.
The data is screen by the rule base, and if it is authorized by the security policy to leave the trusted network it is then placed on known memory location.
The NON-TRUSTED GAP hardware retrieves the data and passes it on to its application. The application on the NON-TRUSTED retransmits the data with TCP/UDP protocol to the non-trusted network. The underlying assumption in this scenario is that the data originates in the trusted side, and therefore there is no coding and no electronic signature on outbound traffic.
IV. REFLECTIVE GAP

A. Role
The Reflective GAP interacts with the two processors through their local bus in a DMA transfer means. The Reflective GAP is the Trusted; it is responsible to create DMA session in both sides.
The Reflective GAP is hardware-based and its purpose is to rapidly mirror buffers from the Non-Trusted memory to the Trusted memory, and vice versa; Hence the term "reflection". The Reflective GAP is not based on any communication protocol and all its activities are achieved using store & forward of memory blocks.
The Reflective GAP consists of two separate data paths, one for transmission and the other for receiving. As the data path from Non-Trusted to Trusted is shown in the direction from left to right, the data path from Trusted to Non-Trusted is the opposite direction from right to the left. Each double switch mechanism is implemented in hardware inside the Reflective GAP logic, for traffic incoming into it.
B. Responsibilities
All the Non-Trusted (and the entire non-trusted network behind it) can do is send data blocks to the NonTrusted Reflective GAP. The Non-Trusted Reflective GAP transfers them to the Trusted, which places passive data blocks, garbled, into memory buffers designated by the software on the Trusted computer. It is now up to the Trusted to handle the data as it pleases. This is similar to Sneaker net, where the operator puts a diskette with the data in the drive, and the computer on the trusted network can read the data and manipulate it as it pleases. All logic in the Reflective GAP is controlled by hardware and cannot be modified, in the same manner that a floppy drive cannot be modified to write to a write-protected diskette. A Reflective GAP implements a GAP between the Trusted and the Non-Trusted, and this GAP cannot be breached even if the Non-Trusted computer is completely taken over by hackers.
A similar data path takes place for data sent from the Trusted to the Non-Trusted, utilizing the remaining components of the Non-Trusted and Trusted.
V. MAIN HARDWARE MODULE
A. Trusted SBC
The Trusted is the Computer inside the GAP device that is connected to the trusted network. On the Trusted runs proprietary software that delivers to the trusted network traffic from the Non-Trusted. In short, the Trusted receives garbled data, checks it against the security policy that is stored on the Trusted and makes all security decisions in a safe environment that is isolated from the non-trusted network. If the security policy dictates it, the data is dropped. If all is well, the Trusted generates a completely new session with the computer on the trusted network to which the information was addressed, decodes the data again (knowing that it is safe because it has been inspected) and sends it to its destination.
B. Non-Trusted SBC
The Non-Trusted is the only Computer inside the GAP that is connected to the non-trusted network. On the Non-Trusted runs proprietary software that listens to incoming traffic from the non-trusted network. The NonTrusted Software sends data blocks across the GAP by delivering it to the Bus Interface. Before doing so, the Non-Trusted Software digitally signs each data block with a key that is regenerated in every boot of the system, and is passed to the Non-Trusted Software by the Security Board. The Non-Trusted Software uses a key transformation mechanism after each use of the key. This renders eavesdropping to previous transmissions useless because the key is transformed into another in between transmissions. The purpose of the digital signature is to make it difficult for other software to impersonate the Non-Trusted Software. Although even if that takes place, the unique properties of the GAP ensure that the security of the GAP chip is not compromised.
C. Control Board
The control board was designed in order to replace the old LCD card and to add some more crucial features related to the power management of the NetGAP.
The control board response to commands from the hardware push buttons and software requests initiated by the NG ADMIN or the NG terminal consol in the following Fig2.
Reset will be executed 1 sec before the ATX shuts down every time that soft shut down is requested, in order to prevent damage to the HD while abnormal shutdown is being executed. Hardware commands have priority over the software request and also cancel every software request. There are seven main software modules that comprise the "GAP" system. Six out of the seven modules are actually twin modules that reside on both sides of the "GAP", the trusted and non-trusted sides. The trusted side ("Trusted") is the side that is connected to the trusted network, while the non-trusted side ("NonTrusted") is the side that is connected to the non-trusted network. The remained module (the one that does not have a twin module) is the security module that handles the protocol security decisions in the system. For security reasons, it resides, on the trusted side of the "GAP".
A single datagram goes through five modules in its life cycle in the system. The Fig3. shows the basic seven modules and the flow of a single datagram.
A datagram can come from both sides of the network (the trusted and non-trusted sides). In both cases, it passes the same route of modules. The only difference between one route to the other, is where the datagram crosses the "GAP" chip and moves to from one CPU to the second CPU.
The route of a datagram starts at the "TCP module" which is a proxy module. It stops the datagram, packs the data buffer to an application message and passes the message to the "Parser Modules". The "Parser Module" does the protocol parsing analysis, creates a proprietary "parsed message" and sends it to the "Trusted Module". The "Trusted Module" does most of the security decisions and transfers the "approved" parsed messages to the "Regenerator Module". Here the "Parsed" data is regenerated to a similar but not equal to the original "buffered form" message. Finally, it is handled by the seconds "TCP Module" proxy, which mirrors the original session. 
A. TCP Module
The "TCP Module" is a proxy module that handles all TCP/UDP sessions in the system. It relies on the OS TCP stack (or some other TCP stack). Additional IP protocols like DHCP and ICMP will require additional proprietary secured modules. The "GAP" system does not reflect IP packets to the trusted side.
The "TCP Module" receives its input from both the "Regenerator Module" and the network. The "Trusted Module" controls the "TCP Module" (via the "Regenerator Module") using command messages. These command messages are translated by the "TCP Module" to perform network tasks. Other messages that the "TCP Module" is handling are the "data messages". In this case, the "TCP Module" sends the buffers that reside in those messages. When data arrives from the network, the "TCP Module", which is a proxy application, strips the data from the TCP packet and creates an inner application data message.
The "TCP Module" maintains a table of protocol sessions. Each entry in the table ties together all of the sockets and other resources that associated with the session. A session can comprise more than one socket (e.g. FTP with its command and data sockets). Because of performance matters, we also map between socket id and an entry in the table.
B. Parser Module
The "Parser Module" requires protocol data messages. It performs syntax checks and constructs the same message in a proprietary compact representation. This is message is called the "parsed message".
The "Parser Module" holds "Parser Units" for each protocol session that it is currently handling. Each data message that is received from the "TCP Module" is delegated to the appropriate "Parser Unit" for parsing. After the parsing process is finished a parsed message is sent to the "Trusted Module
C. Trusted Module -The Main Security Module
The "Trusted Module" is the singular point where the entire protocol session messages are processed from both the trusted and non-trusted sides. It is the only module in the system that receives messages from the two sides of the network. The reason for this uniqueness relies on its assignment to handle the protocol state-machine and to make security decisions. The "Trusted Module" makes security decisions based on a global configurable rulebase. According to the protocol state machine and the global rule base, this unit can either generate command messages to the two "TCP Modules" (e.g. "Open new connection", "close session" etc…), or pass the "parsed message" to the next module; the "Regenerator Module".
D. Regenerator Module
The "Regenerator Module" is the "reverse image" of the "Parser Module". The term "reverse image" refers to the task that the "Regenerator Module" performs. "Regenerator Module" takes parsed messages and regenerates them to application data messages in the standard protocol format. These messages are similar but not equal to original application data messages that the "TCP Module" has generated. The "Regenerator Module" passes its messages to the last module in the chain, the second "TCP Module".
VII. THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF SESSION MECHANISM
A. Agent
Agent is a user-defined component, which is responsible for a specific task [6] . The task can be huge or small depends upon user design. The agent must obey the following rules:
·The agent knows his "Father", his creator. ·The agent registers to his "Father event dispatcher" for various events, which he is interested. This mechanism is implements using the observer-subject design pattern.
·The agent must inform his creator that he has finished by sending an eventDone message.
·The agent must implement a terminate method used by the agent activator to instruct the agent to terminate its current task.
B. Agent Activator
It is first of all an agent but with the added capability to create/destroy agents. Agent's creation/destruction is done by the agent factory class described next. The agent activator holds an event dispatcher used by all agents created by this class to register for the messages he is interested. This class also holds agent repository, which holds all activated agents by this class. This class is also responsible for destroying the agent when an agentDone message is received.
C. Agent Factory
It is capable of creating/destroying agents by Id. This class can be a singleton as part of the agent infrastructure or each agent activator can hold an instance of this class used by him to create agents.
The following figure outlines the various relationships between all classes in this framework. 
A. GAPSession Agent activator
This class implements a generic state machine, which is relevant during GAP session establishment and during GAP session closing. After "GAPSession" has been established successfully this class activates a protocol specific agent, which then takes over the "GAPSession" state machine management. 
B. GAPSessionContentChecker Agent activator
This agent handles all file accumulation process. File accumulation process involves three major tasks, first accumulating the received data to some temporary storage, the second sending the file to content inspection engine and the last transmitting the file back to the requester. This agent maintains a generic state machine that that can be used by all protocols.
C. File accumulation Agent
This Agent receives "file" messages and is responsible for storing the encoded file on a persistent storage. This storage can be local on the Trusted CPU or remote on another CPU over TCP/IP connection or over the GAP/PCI bus. The GAPSessionContentChecker agent as part of the content inspection process creates this agent.
D. Content inspection Agent
This agent is part of the content inspection process. This agent is activated after file accumulation is finished (received FileClose event). This agent receives file handle and a list of all content checkers that should check the file, (anti virus, format checker and so on). The content checkers can run on different CPU over the GAP or over TCP/IP. When content inspection is finished the Agent returns the check result to his activator (GAPSessionContentChecker agent).
E. Transmit File Agent
This agent is part of the content inspection process. This agent is activated after the file has been checked and approved by the content checker. This agent receives a file handle (stored locally or remotely on some persistent storage), sessionId and FlowControl object, these parameters are than used by the agent in order to read data from stored file and send them over TCP/IP (according to sessionId) to the client.
The following figure describes the main state machine of session manager. 
F. Protocol stream Agent
This agent is created by GAPSession agent after the "GAPed session" was successfully established. This agent responsibility is:
·Maintaining a protocol specific state machine (SMTP, HTTP and so on).
·Asking the Rulebase for approval (according to user predefined rules) and if approved continuing the "GAPed session" data flow.
·Activating other protocol specific agents, for example (radius agent) if needed.
·Activating GAPSessionContentChecker if instructed by the Rulebase.
IX. DATA FLOW SCENARIOS
A. Establish a new connection process
First new connection request messages are generated by the TCP/IP listen task, which accepts client connections to the system. The TCP/IP module sends new connection messages to the Trusted sessionFactoryMailbox this is due to the fact that session Id's (Unique number for the new session) are generated in the Trusted and not in the TCP/IP module.
When new connection request is received, the sessionFactory worker will ask the TcpIpRulebase for approval according to the TCP/IP parameters of the new connection (Source IP, Source Port, Destination IP, and Destination Port). If the TcpIpRulebase rejects the connection the sessionFactory sends a returns the message with connect Nack to the Tcp/Ip originator. If the TcpIpRulebase accepts the connection the sessionFactory assigns a sessionId to the new connection, fills the sessionId in the connection message and sends it to the other TCP/IP module, but now over the appropriate mailbox.
The following describes how a new connection is handled. 
B. Deal with protocol events
MasterWorker is based on mailboxes and "worker with a mailbox". Each worker handles all or a portion of the total "GAPed" sessions. The system automatically creates X workers. Each worker attaches himself by name, to his mailbox and blocks until new messages are pushed to his mailbox.
When a protocol event arrives, it will be pushed to mailboxes. The worker attaches it by name and dispatches the message to the appropriate GAPSession agent based on the message session id. This Protocol specific Stream agent will do the following:
·Maintaining a protocol specific state machine (SMTP, HTTP and so on.).
Then protocol event message will be transmitted to Regenerator module. The following figure describes the process. "GAPSession" agent sends a close session message to both Tcp/Ip modules after it receives an agent done message from protocol specific agent. This message instructs the Tcp/Ip module to release all allocated session resources for this session.
C. Closing session
X. CONCLUSION
In above sections, we introduced our proposed network isolation system model based on Reflective architecture. The Reflective GAP is hardware-based and its purpose is to rapidly mirror buffers from the NonTrusted memory to the trusted memory, and vice versa. Its activities are achieved using store & forward of memory blocks. And, we researched the implementation of this model by LVDS bus and high speed double switch technique.
The "GAP" system comprises with seven main software modules. Six out of the seven modules are actually twin modules that reside on both sides of the "GAP", the trusted and non-trusted sides. The remained module is the security module that handles the protocol security decisions in the system. The NetGAP consists of two separate data paths, one for transmission and the other for receiving. As the data path from Non-Trusted to Trusted is shown in the direction from left to right, the data path from Trusted to Non-Trusted is the opposite direction from right to the left. By the use of agent we can construct session mechanism in its two sides.
In conclusion, the Reflective GAP implements a GAP between the Trusted and the Non-Trusted, and cannot be breached even if the Non-Trusted computer is completely taken over by hackers. 
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